Spreading the Word of the Cambodian Genocide
CAMBODIA RESEARCH CENTRE
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copyright : 1998, Raoul Marc Jennar
CRC A/16
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS
The establishment of the National Assembly is both, a recognition and an acceptance
of the results of the elections by the elected members who have been sworn
in. It marks the end of the election process.
The composition of a government - which, in a parliamentary democracy, could
take effect under circumstances other than after a poll - is a matter that
is no longer part of the election process. The end of this process allows
for an analysis of the results fo the elections.
For budgetary reasons, the CRC papers are sent by email only. This presents
certain constraints, particularly when texts are complemented by tables.
Tables have been simplified when possible to avoid figures from appearing
dispersed. Should this occur, we would like to apologise. We do
hope that the analysis of the figures is explicit enough to allow a good comprehension.
Tables have been avoided when possible.
Abbreviations:
FUNCINPEC: French acronym for National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Pacific and Co-operative Cambodia; created in 1981 by the then Prince Norodom
Sihanouk. The presidency of the party was passed onto the Prince Norodom
Ranariddh in 1992.
CPP: Cambodian People's Party; stems from the People's Revolutionary Party
of Kampuchea in 1991. The latter was recreated on the 5 January 1979.
The president of the CPP is Mr. Chea Sim.
SRP: Sam Rainsy Party; holds the name of its president after having been constrained
to change its original name (Khmer Nation Party) given to it upon its creation
in 1995.
A. THE RESULTS
A.1 VALID VOTES
In 1993, there were 4,011,631 valid votes. In 1998, 4,902,508 votes
were valid, showing a progression of 22.21%. Overall participation amounted
to 93.74%.
The progression in the number of valid votes is not only due to the growth
in the population, it also results from the fact that, in 1993, large portions
of Khmer Rouge controlled territory had been declared "inaccessible zones"
by UNTAC. UNTAC had renounced its mandate in these zones, particularly
that of organising elections.
The growth in the number of valid votes is particularly significant in the
provinces of Kompong Thom (+46.40%), Preah Vihear (+70.26) and Siem Reap (45.14%).
Wide areas of the three provinces had been controlled by the Khmer Rouge in
1993. The percentage of valid votes that result from both, a participation
rate above 90% and a greater possibility for voters to participate in the
poll increases its representativeness.
It is also interesting to note the creation of two new constituencies in 1998;
constituencies which did not exist in 1993; namely Kep and Pailin.
1993 1998
difference
in %
Banteay Meanchey 187,465 225,094
+ 20.07
Battambang 266,973
300,333 + 12.49
Kampong Cham 597,766
721,224 + 20.65
Kampong Chhnang 133,801 168,763
+ 26.13
Kampong Speu 201,355
245,335 + 21.84
Kampong Thom 155,372
227,461 + 46.40
Kampot 190,756
224,311 + 17.59
Kandal 377,288
509,080 + 34.93
Koh Kong 41,299
46,809 + 13.34
Kratie
86,971 107,804 + 23.95
Mondulkiri 10,392
11,872 + 14.24
Phnom Penh 440,737
475,181 + 7.81
Preah Vihear 28,361
48,288 + 70.26
Prey Veng 382,098
442,421 + 15.79
Pursat 119,301
132,812 + 11.32
Ratanakiri 30,708
35,904 + 16.92
Siem Reap 194,735
282,646 + 45.14
Sihanoukville 55,320
64,538 + 16.66
Stung Treng 27,364
31,168 + 13.90
Svay Rieng 191,078
218,251 + 14.22
Takeo
292,491 358,916 + 22.71
Kep
12,553
Pailin
11,744
Total 4,011,631
4.902,508 + 22.21
The increase in the number of votes and the reorganisation of the constituencies
have both affected the increase in the number of parliamentary seats, from
120 to 122.
A 2. RESULTS OF PARTIES OBTAINING ELECTED OFFICIALS
CPP: 2,030,790, that is 41.42%, 64 seats (51 in 1993)
FUNCINPEC: 1,554,405, that is 31.70%, 43 seats (58 in 1993)
SRP: 699,665, that is 14.27%, 15 seats.
The 617,648 remaining votes were distributed among the 36 parties that obtained
no seats.
A 3. RESULTS OF THE 8 PARTIES STEMMING FROM THE 1993 FUNCINPEC
(total number of votes obtained and percentage of the total number of valid
votes)
FUNCINPEC: (Norodom Ranariddh): 1,554,405, that s 31.70%.
SRP (Sam Rainsy): 699,665, that is, 14.27%
REASTR NIYUM (Ung Huot): 37,308, that is 0.75%
KHMER ANGKOR PARTY (Kong Mony): 26,482, that is, 0.54%
KHMER CITIZEN PARTY (Nguon Soeur): 23,713, that is, 0.49%
KHMER UNITY PARTY (Khieu Rada): 19,232, that is, 0.39%
SANGKUM THMEY: (Loy Sim Chheang): 15,066, that is 0.30%
NATIONAL UNITY PARTY (Toan Chay): 11,889, that is, 0.24%
Total: 2,387,760, that is 48.70%
A 4. THE BLDP AND ITS SPLITTING
In 1993, two political formations were born from the KPNLF, presided by Mr.
Son Sann. The KPNLF was one of the signatory parties of the Paris accords
in 1991. The two political parties, the BLDP and the LDP participate
to the 1993 election. The LDP obtained no elected officials whereas
the BLDP obtained 10 seats. In 1998, three parties emanate from the
1993 BLDP and present themselves at the poll. They obtain no seats.
In 1993
BLDP: 152,764
In 1998
GRAND FATHER SON SANN PARTY (Son Soubert): 45,849
BUDDHIST LIBERAL PARTY (Ieng Mouly): 32,959
LIGHT OF LIBERTY PARTY (Thach Reng): 10,027
The evolution of the 1991 KPNLF provides another example of the tendency of
Cambodian political parties to divide and disperse themselves.
Today, this political current has disappeared from the parliamentary scene.
A 5. COMPARISONS 1993 / 1998
CPP 1993: 1,533,471 (38.23%)
CPP 1998: 2,030,790 (41.42%)
FUNCINPEC 1993: 1,824,188 (45.47%)
FUNCINPEC 1998: 1,554,405 (31.70%)
FUNCINPEC + SRP (1998): 2,254,070 (45.97%)
Total number of votes obtained in 1998 by the 8 parties stemming from the
1993 FUNCINPEC: 2,387,760 (48.70%)
The addition of the votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC and those of the SRP in
1998 represents an increase of 23.56% from the votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC
alone in 1993. Adding up the votes obtained by the 8 parties stemming
from the FUNCINPEC shows an increase of 30.91%.
For reference, the increase in the average total number of valid votes is
of 22.21% (see above).
A 6. RESULTS OF THE CPP BY CONSTITUENCY
1993 1998
seats en
1993/1998
Banteay Meanchey 53,137
84,225 2/3
Battambang 82,735
107,825 3/3
Kampong Cham 183,268
246,900 6/7
Kampong Chhnang 70,532
78,692 2/3
Kanpong Speu 105,085
124,458 3/4
Kampong Thom 69,848
93,467 3/4
Kampot 76,494
104,596
3/4
Kandal 94,755
184,742
3/4
Koh Kong 19,992
20,379 1/1
Kratie 20,998
35,297
1/1
Mondulkiri 6,987
8,296 1/1
Phnom Penh 136,442
140,409 4/4
Preah Vihear 19,095
34,203 1/1
Prey Veng 186,820
220,915 6/7
Pursat 55,148
58,918
2/2
Ratanakiri 25,522
27,162 1/1
Siem Reap 65,579
137,661 2/3
Sihanoukville 18,492
24,067 0/1
Stung Treng 16,526
17,761 1/1
Svay Rieng 108,205
117,687 3/4
Takeo 117,811
153,808
3/4
Kep
6,296 -/1
Pailin
3,326 -/0
Total 1,533,471
2,030,790 51/64
A 7. RESULTS OF THE FUNCINPEC BY CONSTITUENCY
1993 1998
seats en
1993/1998
Banteay Meanchey 88,013 56,439
3/2
Battambang 128,694
82,653 4/3
Kompong Cham 322,358 277,362
10/8
Kompong Chhnang 43,511 47,046
2/1
Kompong Speu 57,767
62,882 2/2
Kompong Thom 55,434
69,711 2/2
Kampot 80,313
63,488
3/2
Kandal 225,083
198,073
7/5
Koh Kong 14,699
11,262 0/0
Kratie 54,916
45,497
2/2
Mondulkiri 1,765
2,068 0/0
Phnom Penh 239,815 159,008
7/4
Preah Vihear 5,478
6,592 0/0
Prey Veng 148,499
143,068 4/4
Pursat 42,614
42,760
2/2
Ratanakiri 2,225
3,268 0/0
Siem Reap 96,548
69,228 3/2
Sihanoukville 26,010 19,945
1/0
Stung Treng 7,425
5,393 0/0
Svay Rieng 57,139
52,778 2/1
Takeo 125,802
129,388
4/3
Kep
4,316 -/0
Pailin
2,180 -/0
Total : 1,824,188 1,554,405
58/43
A 8. RESULTS OF THE SRP BY CONSTITUENCY
1998 seats
Banteay Meanchey 47,584
1
Battambang 64,199
2
Kompong Cham 96,720
3
Kompong Chhnang 11,143
0
Kompong Speu 19,881
0
Kompong Thom 22,704
0
Kampot
23,516 0
Kandal
80,985 2
Koh Kong
9,111 0
Kratie
14,969 0
Mondulkiri 1,061
0
Phnom Penh 132,127
4
Preah Vihear 4,105
0
Prey Veng 30,161
0
Pursat
11,259 0
Ratanakiri 3,683
0
Siem Reap 43,523
1
Sihanoukville 13,535
0
Stung Treng 6,469
0
Svay Rieng 18,050
0
Takeo
38,152 1
Kep
995 0
Pailin
5,733 1
Total
699,665 15
A 9. COMPARISON OF CPP / FUNCINPEC + SRP VOTES (1998)
PPC FUNCINPEC + SRP
Banteay Meanchey 84,225
104,023
Battambang
107,825 146,852
Kampong Cham 246,900
374,082
Kampong Chhnang 78,692
58,189
Kampong Speu 124,458
82,763
Kampong Thom 93,467
92,415
Kampot
104,596 87,004
Kandal
184,742 279,058
Koh Kong
20,379 20,373
Kratie
35,297 60,466
Mondulkiri
8,296 3,129
Phnom Penh
140,109 291,135
Preah Vihear 34,203
10,697
Prey Veng
220,915 173,229
Pursat
58,918 54,019
Ratanakiri
27,162 6,951
Siem Reap
137,661 112,751
Sihanoukville 24,067
33,480
Stung Treng
17,761 11,862
Svay Rieng
117,687 70,828
Takeo
153,808 167,540
Kep
6,296 5,301
Pailin
3,326 7,913
Total
2,030,790 2,254,070
B. ANALYSIS
The number of seats obtained by the CPP increased from 51 in 1993 to 64 in
1998, representing a gain of 13 seats. The number of seats obtained
by the FUNCINPEC decreased from 58 to 43, showing a loss of 15 seats.
The SRP obtained 15 seats.
Whilst amplified by the chosen method of implementation of the election system,
the shift in the distribution of seats reflects a movement in the distribution
of votes, that is, a shift in the vote of each individual voter.
Indeed, the CPP obtained 1,533,471 votes in 1993 and 2,030,790 in 1998.
The FUNCINPEC goes from 1,800,188 to 1,544,405 votes and the dissident FUNCINPEC
party, the SRP, wins 699,655 votes.
In order to understand the will expressed by the electorate in the 26 July
and, by the same token, verify the accusations of "massive fraud" expressed
by the opposition, one must examine the figures and observe:
a) the degree of fluidity of the electorate,
b) its degree of stability, and
c) in which ways do the above two phenomena give way to manipulations and
frauds, taking into account the increase of the electorate (an increase of
22.21% in valid votes).
The first and most striking observation that stems from the poll is the transfer
of votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC in 1993 to the SRP in 1998 as well as a
split in royalist votes of 1993. Indeed, with 699,665 votes, the SRP
is the primary beneficiary of the erosion of the FUNCINPEC. The other
formations stemming from the royalist party of 1993 obtained a total of 133,690
votes.
There was an important transfer of members of the FUNCINPEC to the KNP (which
became the SRP) of Mr. Sam Rainsy starting in 1995. It is confirmed
by the behaviour of the electorate in 1998. Furthermore, it is evident
that a section of the new electorate brought its vote to the SRP and only
a very small proportion to the FUNCINPEC.
This transfer is confirmed by the shift in the allocation of seats.
The FUNCINPEC lost 15 seats, whilst the SRP gained 15. Seven of the
11 constituencies where the FUNCINPEC lost seats are those where the SRP gained
them. In three of the other 4 constituencies (Kampong Chhnang, Kampot
and Svay Rieng) where the FUNCINPEC lost seats, the 7 other parties emerging
from the 1993 FUNCINPEC total, each time, more than 5,000 votes.
The second observation that can be made from the results is that the CPP gained
votes in all constituencies, although in a very unequal way. In 9 constituencies,
the increase in the number of votes obtained by the CPP is inferior to the
increase in the total number of valid votes for those constituencies (Kampong
Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Koh Kong, Phnom Penh, Pursat, Ratanakiri, Stung Treng,
Svay Rieng). This reflects a
stagnation, and even a decrease, in the number of votes obtained by the CPP.
Nevertheless, compared to the 1993 results, the CPP did not loose any votes
in any of the constituencies, even in Phnom Penh where it gained a meagre
2% of votes. Banteay Meanchey, Kandal, Kratie, Preah Vihear and Siem
Reap are the 5 provinces where the CPP showed the strongest gain. They
are also the provinces where the number of votes obtained by the CPP exceeded
its national average growth.
Third observation; there is a permanent royalist majority in the electorate,
although it is very much split. If the votes obtained in 1998 by the
8 parties emerging from the 1993 FUNCINPEC are added together, the
result is a total that exceeds the 1993 FUNCINPEC result. In 1993, the
FUNCINPEC obtained 45.47% of the votes. In 1998, the total percentage
of votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC and the SRP together equals 45.97%.
Adding up the percentages of the 6 parties to that of the FUNCINPEC and the
SRP, we obtain a total of 48.70%. There is an important element of stability
in the royalist electorate that is not
immediately reflected by the dispersion of its political expression.
Fourth observation; the CPP and the SRP are the two parties that benefited
the most from the emergence of new voters. It is evident for the SRP
in Phnom Penh and in Pailin and for the CPP in Preah Vihear and Siem Reap.
Fifth observation; the votes of Phnom Penh did not reflect the national tendencies.
In the capital, there was a very equal share of votes between the 3 parties.
It is reflected in the equal number of seats obtained by
each of them.
Sixth observation; the above observations leave little space for possible
"massive fraud". In terms of the votes, the major characteristics of
the 1998 poll were not very different from those of the 1993 poll, namely,
a major royalist current and a very powerful CPP. What brought about
a significant change in the political scene of the country is the configuration
of the parties. The CPP remained united, its competitors split.
Upon adopting a Constitution, Cambodia opted for a representative democracy
rather than a direct democracy. It is therefore not possible to give
a legal value to the votes obtained by the different parties, even when these
- as is currently the case- express the same political behaviour.
Both, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP had knowledge of the regulations prior to
the poll. They knew that, upon addressing the electorate as two separate
parties, they considerably decreased their chances of winning.
Had they had the political will to unite their strengths, they would have
had the possibility to merge or to present a list of cartel, that is, a single
list of candidates from both parties. They chose a different strategy.
They must now take responsibility for the consequences of their choices instead
of blaming a "massive fraud" (for which they never presented any proofs) when
the figures show that fraud could not have been more than marginal.
C. THE VALIDITY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESULTS
"Cheap elections"; "Elections of second class"; "Electoral farce". Readers
will have read many things about the 1998 elections in the many newspapers
that covered the event. With few exceptions, these newspapers included
everything except an honest account of the facts.
The bitterness of the many Cambodians who, for months, gave their very best
to the election process, with the intense desire to show the world that Cambodia
is capable of organising credible elections, is as great as it is
comprehensible.
It meant, however, ignoring both, the partisan spirit which fuelled the actions
of many demagogues prepared to do everything and anything and the obliging
nature of journalists who took little care to diversify their sources.
A good example is reflected in an article of the French language newspaper
"Le Soir" distributed world-wide through Internet by the friends of Mr. Sam
Rainsy. The article in question was written by a special envoy who arrived
in Phnom Penh one month after the poll. It quotes an anonymous "independent
observer" whose precision and impartiality are difficult to appreciate.
The observer reproduces, word for word, the discourse of the opposition relating
to the way in which the election operations were observed.
The professionalism of the journalist did not incite her to confront the information
she had received from her ghost speaker with information she could have obtained
from representatives of the observation unit of the
European Union, had she taken the time to visit them. She thus quotes
this unknown observer as follows "on the day of the vote, the observers stayed
in the large cities and only vaguely observed what was happening in the
voting stations; none went to the remote provinces". This statement constitutes
a remarkable model of disinformation. This issue will be analysed further
below.
Why are the Cambodian opposition and the media which support it so intent
upon destroying the observation process?
In a context of absolute suspicion that characterises the Cambodian political
scene - suspicion that is largely justified from all sides in view of what
has been witnessed - only an external observation could testify to the real
value of the poll. Nevertheless, the most neutral and experimented of
observers, who had had experience in detecting fraud or intimidation and who
had observed a number of polls in various countries, were the first to
identify the cheaters, from the very beginning of the registration process.
They observed and reported that SRP commandos had disturbed the formalities
during the registration of voters to discredit the election process from the
very beginning of its first phase. They noted that the CPP Chiefs of
village who, under election law have no responsibilities, were abusing of
their authority. In both cases, they reacted according to international
regulations relating to the observation process. They were able to appreciate
the consideration given to their observation by one and all. They were
able to judge the different reactions. For a SRP whose aim is the destruction
of the current political system (which stems from the 1993 Constitution) the
observers became the enemy. They represented the persons who could validate
the poll. They were the persons who needed to be discredited at all
costs.
The international observers - more than 500 from some 40 countries or groups
of countries - were neither the tourists nor the partisans described by the
journalists. It is these journalists who should have been questioned
about their neutrality. Within teams of observers as large as these
there are, of course, always a few persons who are ill-adapted to undertake
such missions. There is little doubt that certain observers undertook
their
missions with a very narrow frame of mind. The presence of observers
from the International Republican Institute who contributed to the funding
of advisors to Mr. Sam Rainsy did cause a certain amount of unrest amidst
the representatives of international NGOs. The latter were keen to counterbalance
this stance by organising themselves under the umbrella of a former Ambassador
of Australia to Cambodia. These were very isolated
cases. Moreover, their missions have not been proven to have been dishonest.
Nevertheless, these isolated cases should not blemish the professionalism,
the precision, the moral and intellectual honesty of the large majority of
the observers who did come to Cambodia to contribute to the accomplishment
of democracy.
It seems important to recall that the process of observation is different
from a role of supervision or monitoring. Observation is a process whereby
a series of surveys and verifications using a set of defined criteria are
undertaken in at least 10% of randomly selected voting and counting stations.
The process of observation was not improvised for Cambodia alone. It
is a process which abides by precise international norms and which has been
applied to the realities of Cambodia. It follows a very precise methodology.
Foreign observers who came to Cambodia as either long-term observers (starting
from the beginning of the registration of voters up until the swearing in
of the elected officials) or short-term observers (who came for the last days
of the election campaign, the days of the poll and of the counting) were,
for a large majority, prepared for this mission in theory and in practice.
The selection of these observers by the UN as well as by the European Union
prioritised the candidates who had experience in countries with similar situations
as Cambodia and, of course, who had taken part in the 1993 election process.
The insulting statements made against the observers and their spokesman, Mr.
Sven G. Linder, discredit only its authors and journalists. These are
the very same who, like the author of the article in "Le Soir" mentioned
above, gave credit to the observer by quoting so-called experts who remained,
of course, anonymous. Once again, Mr. Sam Rainsy language was the most
outrageous inciting to hate and xenophobia. But, as usual,
"what is extreme is trivial" and Mr. Sam Rainsy statements do not depreciate
the quality of the observation process and the relevance of the observers
final conclusion.
The resources available for the observation process were exceptionally significant.
They included a contingency of foreign observers. More essential, however,
was the impressive framing of the polling and counting stations by more than
15,000 Cambodian observers who were grouped into three co-ordinating NGOs:
COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC.
These organisations proved, with a lot of courage and on many occasions, their
independence from the authorities. Their observers received special training
which was evaluated by foreign observers.
Contrary to the statement made by the anonymous observer quoted above in the
newspaper "Le Soir", the international observers were deployed throughout
the country, with priority on constituencies which were the most heavily populated
and whose vote would be decisive in the allocation of seats between the main
parties. They proceeded to work, not only in the main towns of these
constituencies, but also in less significant rural areas. The work of
the observers was by no means "a vague glance". It was a systematic
verification of a list of specifications which enabled to determine the level
of quality of the poll. With respect to the number of polling and counting
stations visited, the international observers exceeded
international standards. As for their Cambodian counterparts, they were
present in all polling and counting stations.
In the issue CRC 9, we quoted various views formulated by different groups
of observers with regards to the election process. None declared that
the election operations should be invalidated. Taking into account certain
nuances and variable intensities of the existence of fraud, the appraisals
have, by and large, confirmed that the poll enabled Cambodians to freely express
their choice and that the results express that choice.
As was declared by the international observers' co-ordination, "what could
be observed by us on Polling and Counting Day was a process which was free
and fair to an extent that enables it to reflect, in a credible way, the will
of the Cambodian people".
This appraisal was once again reiterated recently by Ambassador Sven G. Linder,
on the 2 October, date of his departure, when he declared that: "The European
Union Observation Unit has found no indication of flaws and frauds of a magnitude
that could have distorted the will of the Cambodian voters as that will was
expressed on the 26th of July."
The government of the United States equally confirmed, on two separate occasions,
the appraisal of the American observers, as was published in the CRC 9 paper.
Indeed, on 28 September, Mr. Ralph A. Boyce, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs declared to the House
of Representatives: ". . . We see this as a credible expression of the free
will of Cambodians. (. . .) Some of the recounts demanded by the
opposition were carried out, and many of the allegations turned out to be
frivolous. (. . .) A final point here on the credibility of the
election outcome: to the best of our knowledge, even completion of the recounts
would not have significantly altered the overall outcome or deprived the CPP
of plurality. The independent and reputable Cambodian NGO, COMFREL,
which fielded over 15,000 poll watchers, conducted its own parallel count
on election day; it is worth noting that, by COMFREL's count, the CPP also
won a clear plurality of the vote."
On the 2 October, Mr. Stanley O. Roth, Assistant to Ms. M. Albright for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs declared to the US Senate that: "The election results
indicate that Cambodians indeed voted freely: some six out of ten voters chose
a party other than the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It may
be useful to note, Mr. Chairman, that had the opposition unified prior to
the elections, they, and not Hun Sen's CPP, would have primary responsibility
for forming a new government. (. . .) we must recognize that in the judgement
of most international observers, proper completion of the recounts would not
have significantly altered the outcome or deprived the CPP of its plurality."
We are far from thinking that what is right for the US is right for the rest
of the world. Nevertheless, such appraisals are not without significance
when they are statements made by a government hostile to Mr. Hun Sen and to
the CPP and reticent to accept the option of elections as a way of solving
the crisis of July 1997.
D. ALLOCATION OF SEATS
Mr. Pieter Schier, representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Cambodia,
expressed himself like the expert and the spokesman of the opposition concerning
technical issues related to the election process.
His NGO has, for the past several years, seriously contributed to the information
and examination by the Cambodian authorities on these issues. Hence,
it is necessary to examine the very smart arguments developed by Mr. Schier
with regards to the refusal of the opposition to accept the formula retained
by the National Election Committee (NEC) on the 29 May. This formula
puts into effect the method by which the principle of the highest average
is used. The election law provides that the allocation of the seats
is organised in the framework of a system of proportional representation.
Mr. Schier developed his ideas in number 18 (Vol. 7) of an anti-CPP newspaper
(Phnom Penh Post, 21 August, pages 6-7).
D 1. THE FORMULA
Within the framework of an election system based on proportional representation,
there are several formulae that put into effect the principle of the highest
average. We know well the Jefferson and the D'Hondt formulae from which
the NEC inspired itself. Equally, there are other formulae named after
their authors: Balinski, Farell, O'Neal, Webster, Young.
These formulae are characterised by a variation with respect to the principle
of proportionality. Certain formulae apply a strict proportionality, while
others balance it so as to avoid the scattering of parliamentary representation
already favoured by the system of proportionality itself.
As has been indicated in the CRC 12 paper, various formulae, including that
of D'Hondt, have been developed to avoid a democratic political system from
being paralysed by the multiplicity of parties.
It is true, as has been indicated by Mr. Schier, that a strict interpretation
of the principle of proportionality means "the number of seats allocated to
a party is proportional to the number of votes obtained by the party."
Nevertheless, it is precisely in order to counter the consequences of such
a strict interpretation of the principle that other formulae have been developped.
One must be of good faith. The opponents of democracy - particularly
in Asia where democracy and development have been opposed - have always declared
it to be the least efficient in the management of a country. It is only
true when confronted with situations like, for example, that of the IVth French
Republic or that in Belgium or Italy prior to the recent constitutional changes.
The multiplicity of parties paves the way of weak coalitions that are less
apt to make choices or take decisions. Governmental crises follow each
other and instability reigns.
Those who developed different formulae in the application of the strict proportionality
have attempted to reconcile the most honest representation of the will of
the people with a minimum of efficiency required by a political system to
respond to the management needs of a country.
The formula opted for by the NEC on the 29 May is the result of a choice which
the NEC was in its own right to make in view of the legal right to interpretation
of the election law conferred by Article 16 of this law.
One can disagree with this choice. The implications of this choice are
fundamental, as was demonstrated by Mr. Schier. Five seats depend upon
the adopted formula. Considering the decision of the 29 May, those seats
are attributed to the CPP, which thus obtains the absolute majority.
The implementation of other formulae would have provoked a different distribution
of seats which would have benefited the opposition and reduced the number
of CPP seats to 59, thus giving it only a relative majority. However,
nobody can accuse the NEC of choosing a formula with the intention of favouring
the CPP since nobody could have foreseen which party would be the beneficiary
of its application. Certain declarations of opposition representatives show
that they themselves hoped to benefit from this formula (see below).
D 2. LEGALITY OF THE FORMULA
According to Mr. Schier, the formula of the 29 May could "perhaps be illegal"
since:
a) the NEC did not specifically inform the political parties and the NGOs
concerned by the election process of the change which occurred on the 29 May
in relation to the working document under discussion since the beginning of
the month of May. The NEC would have then been guilty of a lack of transparency.
To this, it is easy to respond that:
- There has been no changes per se since the documents dealing with this issue
at the beginning of May had no official value and were only working documents
which had been released to certain individuals by pure indiscretion;
- There was no need to give particular warning on the issue which, although
fundamental, was a part of many other issues of equal value in a document
of 200 pages important as a whole since it formulated the rules and regulations;
- The NEC cannot be accused of any other tentative of dissimulation or lack
of transparency. After having invited the political parties to the release
of the document of 200 pages comprising the entire rules and regulations,
the NEC invited them to attend explanation sessions at the beginning of June.
Few participated. None raised the issue of the formula. On the
other hand, a special paper completely describing the formula was included
in the press file released to journalists a few days after the opening of
the NEC media centre at the beginning of July;
- In responding to a question of the newspaper "The Cambodia Daily" (24 June),
Mr. Sam Rainsy declared that the issue of the formula was "not important".
His declaration proves, at least, that he was informed a month
after the decision of the NEC and a month before the election. One would
think that the president of a party such as him would express an opinion only
in full knowledge of the facts.
b) Most of the political parties would have had knowledge of the formula applied
by the NEC only after the elections and, according to Mr. Schier, one could
not blame them of having been negligent since the principle political opposition
parties dedicated all of their energy to rebuilding structures destroyed during
the 1997 "coup".
This argument is not very strong.
- First of all, on the legal front, as everybody knows, "nobody can use his
own ignorance as a pretext."
- Secondly, it is pertinent to note that, between the 29 May and the 26 July,
there are 59 days, a time frame largely sufficient for opposition parties,
who aspire to exercise governmental responsibilities, to study an issue as
important as the formula.
- Thirdly, as has been shown in the CRC 10 paper, the main opposition parties
resumed their activities during the first quarter of the year and a real pre-election
campaign took place in April / May, prior to the actual official election
campaign. Furthermore, the collapse of the FUNCINPEC network did not
originate from the 1997 crisis. It originated in the method used by
the president of this party to manage the structures after 1993.
We have for proof the fact that Prince Norodom Sirivudh, after having left
the government and whilst still Secretary General of his party, had, as his
main political objective, the reanimation of these structures. Several
declarations made during this period testify to this end.
c) There are no references to a change in the formula concerning the allocation
of seats in the documents of the NEC dated 29 May nor have any minutes been
written of a debate on this issue between the members of the NEC. To
counter this criticism which has been largely supported by the anglo-saxon
press and by the opposition (criticism which was branded "the issue of the
minutes of the NEC"), one could say that the NEC did not
apply a constant and unique procedure of decision-making and that is merely
respected the legal prescription (Art. 17) whereby any decision taken requires
the agreement of the absolute majority of the members (that is 6/11).
Due to the excessive number of varied and complex duties which it had to carry
out in a very short space of time, the NEC distributed responsibilities between
its members and delegated a great number of decisions. The president
used his authority as a last resort, once options had been chosen. By
doing so, the NEC did not, in any way, violate the law. No dispute from
at least 6 of its members arose after the 29 May questioning the method of
implementation of the law relating to the allocation of seats. Reservations
from H.E. Mr. Kassie Neou, Vice-president of the NEC, have often been cited.
His moral integrity, his intellectual honesty and his neutrality are well
known. In an opinion article
published by "The Cambodia Daily" on the 27 August, he wrote "The proportional
representation system decided on before the election, consistent with the
election law, favours the single party with the highest number of votes in
a given province." Such a statement should suffice in closing the debate
regarding the decision taken by the NEC.
d) Lastly, a rather unconvincing argument from Mr. Schier: the texts dating
from the beginning of May did not include the title "project". One could
maybe condemn the methodology used to produce documents where the title of
"project" did not appear on documents which were for internal use and in no
was destined to be distributed. A draft remains a draft as long as it
has not been revised into the format of an official document.
This was done on the 29 May. None of the texts that were released to
the public before the 29 May were presented as official documents of the NEC.
Those who had, by certain indiscretions, access to internal documents were
no doubt proud to present them as official documents.
Nevertheless, not a single opposition party took the time to verify with the
NEC officials before the 29 May whether the documents that had been released
through leaks were "projects" or official documents. When one pretends
to govern a country, one does not consider any old piece of paper as being
an authentic document.
Mr. Schier does concede that article 16 of the election law grants the NEC
the responsibility of deciding upon matters relating to the formula to be
used for the allocation of seats. However, he fails to indicate the
extent of delegation granted by the law to the NEC. The first paragraph
of Article 16 grants the NEC general competence, indicating that it "has all
of the necessary competencies required to accomplish its mission." This
delegation of competencies is further enforced by paragraph 4 which concerns
a particular one, namely, the competence "to develop regulations, procedures
and directives necessary to ensure the development of the elections within
the context of the laws in force." No jurist, in view of the scope of
delegation of competencies granted by the legislator would dare to support
the statements saying that the NEC acted beyond its mandate.
The formula was presented as an official NEC document dated 29 May, that is,
more than 50 days before the poll. It was thus adopted in tempore non
suspecto. It was so within the context of Article 16 of the election
law granting the NEC extensive power relating to the implementation of legal
provisions. The formula of the 29 May is, without any doubts, perfectly
legal.
Three lessons can be learned from the issue of the formula:
- The political culture in Cambodia is still not very thorough when it comes
to the importance of norms, of their rigorous formulation and of their strict
application. The view of Cambodians with regards to the norms is still
an issue for those whose ambition it is to implement the rule of law.
- The legislator has a specific duty that he must fulfil in order to avoid
important problems of interpretation. This is particularly important
in a country which does not have a democratic tradition and which is therefore
prone to deadlocks. A legislator cannot hide his doubts through vague
formulae. Should the system of proportional representation be kept,
the election law must then be amended and the formula chosen by the legislator
for the implementation of the principle of the highest average must be legalised.
- Political parties that are granted a significant place within the political
system have certain responsibilities. They must take their responsibilities
and not neglect them. The man who is, since the 26 July, the most vehement
opponent of the system of allocation of seats adopted on 29 May, declared
on the 24 June in "The Cambodia Daily" that this issue was not important.
Irresponsibility is incompatible with the idea of democracy.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Article 82 of the Constitution describes the procedures of the establishment
the National Assembly. It includes three elements: the verification
of powers, the swearing in and the designation of what is commonly described
in parliamentary law as the Permanent committee (President, vice-presidents,
committees presidents).
With the establishment of this Permanent Committee, the election process ends
and the legislature starts. In respect to the most classical types of
parliamentary law, while the verification of powers and the swearing in represent
the final stages of the election process, the election of the officials result
from political choices which are the bases of a legislature already underway.
During the meeting of the 24 September in Siem Reap, only one of the two procedures
which enable the confirmation of the validity of the Assembly was carried
out. We have noted that the elected were sworn in without having first, as
should have been the case, passed through a verification of their full powers.
However, it must be acknowledged that the competencies conferred to the Constitutional
Council with regards to election issues transform the issue of verification
of MP powers into a simple administrative formality.
The decisive element is that, by being sworn in, each of the Members of Parliament
accepts the mandate that he/she has pledged to put into effect according to
its stipulations. By being collectively sworn in, the elected officials
have accepted the distribution of mandates resulting from the poll.
We can therefore conclude that, following the 24 September session, the National
Assembly was established, ending the election process.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The Cambodian electorate displays a great stability. There is a vast
royalist majority and a strong CPP, as was the case in 1993. What has
changed is the political expression of the royalist tendency. In 1993,
it was represented by only one party. In 1998, eight parties were eager
to win the votes of a single electorate.
The votes of the opposition were not "stolen", as has been claimed by the
FUNCINPEC and SRP leaders so light-heartedly and with a great deal of bad
faith. The votes were scattered.
This is the direct consequence of disputes between personalities, conflicting
ambitions and internal divisions resulting in the splitting of the two large
structures opposing the CPP in 1993 into 11 parties in 1998.
The old Cambodian habit of blaming others for the consequences of one's own
mistakes!
A rigorous examination of the results shows that eventual fraud and manipulations
could only have been marginal.
In 1998, the total number of votes scattered amongst the 8 parties emerging
from the 1993 FUNCINPEC is greater that the total number of votes obtained
by the FUNCINPEC alone in 1993.
If those who had answered to the appeal of the founder of the FUNCINPEC in
1981 had remained united, they would have had, in 1998, a devastating parliamentary
majority. The splitting in 1994 inspired others such that we find eight competing
parties in 1998. The royalists are the first to be responsible for their
recent weakness.
Due to the fact that the opposition does not accept a defeat for which it
is responsible, it now puts forth accusations of "massive fraud" which do
not stand any serious examination. No one will be surprised to hear the outrageous
statements of a Sam Rainsy who has definitely disqualified himself as a reasonable
democrat. Nevertheless, it is a surprise to find that the FUNCINPEC officials
still believe that they have the ability to convince people using such poor
arguments.
In 1993, the CPP did not obtain the largest number of votes and contested
the validity of the elections. In 1998, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP reproduce
the same scenario. It would be useless to speak of democracy in Cambodia
as long as the political class of this country is unable to even accept the
most elementary of laws. A major question arises: does the Cambodian
political class share the civic spirit that so inspired the Cambodian citizens
in both 1993 and 1998?
Raoul Marc Jennar
12 October 1998
The Cambodia Research Centre has the pleasure to inform his readers that one
of the CRC scholars, Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, presented last September at the
Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, in Paris his thesis
for a Ph.D in Political Science.
The subject of the thesis was "The Cambodian border."
Mr. Jennar received the doctorate with first class honours ("magna cum laude")
and the congratulations of the jury.